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<a>1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to analyse the external dimension of EU criminal law through a 
discussion of the external profile of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), 
the domicile of the European Union’s acquis in the field of criminal law. It is argued 
that in view of growing security challenges from outside the EU borders, the external 
dimension of the AFSJ is not only crucial to EU internal but also, and perhaps most 
importantly, global stability and security. To this end, the preservation of the AFSJ 
necessitates, inter alia, EU international cooperation with non-Member States in 
criminal matters. Beyond the EU classic range of instruments, such as bilateral 
agreements with third countries on extradition or priorities set in the context of 
Association Agreements, EU international cooperation in criminal law also includes less 
known individual mechanisms. In the AFSJ context such mechanisms include, inter 
alia, a strategic partnership with Russia outside the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, individual arrangements with the United States covered by the 
New Transatlantic Agenda,1 as well as external aid programmes and institution building 
contributing to good governance and the rule of law in the Western Balkans.  
This chapter will commence with an analysis of EU criminal justice as an 
external policy. It will identify its restrictions based on the lack of criminal law 
competence in the foreign policy realm. In lieu of the lack of such competence, the 
chapter will then discuss the advancement of indirect EU international cooperation in 
criminal matters by identifying briefly the instruments available and their legal basis. It 
will then put forward some case studies, starting with a consideration of the EU’s 
strategic partnership with Russia and the potential of a new EU-Russia legally binding 
agreement with criminal law implications and the issues of legislative competence 
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surrounding it. The chapter will move on to consider EU policy on capabilities 
enhancement in the Western Balkans as part of the development of regional cooperation 
with a view to EU accession. Once legal competence is established in this context, the 
purpose then is to evaluate the political competency of the EU to influence public policy 
in the field of criminal justice. We will also attempt to identify actual and potential 
stumbling blocks in the transmission of EU rules and norms to neighbouring states. The 
time is ripe since the first forms of EU criminal law post-Lisbon Treaty have been 
enacted and a new constitutional dimension has attached to this field an external 
dimension which is worth observing. 
 
<a>2 EU CRIMINAL JUSTICE AS AN EXTERNAL POLICY 
The AFSJ was originally conceived almost 15 years ago as an internal project which 
was concerned with establishing an area without frontiers with an integrated 
management system. This system is unique in that not only does it constitute a means of 
rights enhancement by offering more ‘Freedom’ to EU citizens but it also contains 
elements of rights restriction in order for the EU to establish more ‘Security’ across its 
borders. As such, the AFSJ concerns both the movement of persons across the European 
‘Area’ through developing a common policy on asylum, immigration and external 
border control as well as restrictions upon their liberties through criminal law. This 
chapter will focus on the latter, i.e., what we commonly refer to post-Lisbon as EU 
criminal law which carries with it new institutional dynamics and legal instruments that 
have only been fully effective since December 2014. As explained in previous chapters 
of this volume, the Lisbon Treaty’s criminal law acquis is based on mutual recognition 
in criminal matters and the possibility of law-making of a procedural nature. 
Accordingly, Article 82(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) provides for the enactment of minimum harmonization Directives in order to 
enable mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters with a cross-border 
dimension.  
Indeed, the areas of EU activity in the field of criminal law have proliferated 
from measures addressing corruption and money laundering to organized crime and 
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terrorism. These areas have received particular attention in various political 
pronouncements as crucial to establishing stability, security and accountability within 
the EU.2 However, since transnational crime cannot be contained within Europe alone, 
most of these areas of EU activity carry a growing external dimension and demand 
international cooperation in order to be carried out more effectively. Yet, despite 
consensus between Member States that the EU must be able to become a global actor by 
developing resilience to respond to transnational crime,3 the external dimension to EU 
criminal law is not matched by an express conferment of competence in the Treaties for 
the EU to act externally on criminal law. Although the development of the external 
dimension of the AFSJ has been manifest since the Amsterdam Treaty, criminal law 
was for a long time tangled up in the former ‘third pillar’ and only recently became part 
of EU law proper. 4 
One could further argue that the AFSJ is by default not an area of intense 
external activity for the simple reason that it begun its lifecycle as an internal policy put 
together for the benefit of the European citizenry. Based on evidence provided by the 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty of, the AFSJ could still be perceived as such in the field 
of criminal law. Becoming an EU internal policy is a novelty for police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters which, save for a few highlights (such as Pupino5 and 
the environmental crimes cases6), enjoyed a rather ‘safe’ past as part of the inter-
governmental ‘third pillar’ domain. In the current de-pillarized setting, however, what is 
now referred to as EU criminal law has unveiled judicial challenges which concern 
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traditional (may we anachronistically say ‘Communitarian’) questions related to the 
internal division of competences between the EU and its Member States. This 
competence delimitation issue has been amplified due to both the intimate connection of 
criminal justice with national sovereignty, and the dual and often conflicting sources of 
fundamental rights and due process protection manifest in the EU and its Member 
States.7 So the argument goes that for as long as EU internal competence in the field of 
criminal law is fuzzy and unresolved, the EU’s external competence is deemed to 
remain fragmented and earthbound.  
Thus, competence, or the lack of it, constitutes a major stumbling block for the 
EU’s development and external profile-building in criminal matters. This is the case 
despite the fact that the EU’s action on the international scene is augmented by the 
Lisbon Treaty in the form of express provisions regarding its legal personality (Article 
47 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)), the capacity to negotiate agreements with 
third countries or international organizations (Article 218 TFEU) and the possibility to 
pursue common policies and actions to safeguard EU values, fundamental interests, 
security, independence and integrity (Article 21(a) TEU). The conundrum of the lack of 
external criminal law competence is aggravated further by the fact that the Lisbon 
Treaty selectively confers an express external competence in respect of other AFSJ 
policy areas. Thus, while it provides for an external dimension to asylum and 
immigration policy in the form of partnership and cooperation with third countries for 
the purpose of managing inflows of persons applying for asylum or subsidiary or 
temporary protection (Articles 78(2)(g) and 79(3) TFEU) it contains no external 
provisions vis-à-vis criminal law.  
As such, the EU may only employ its implied powers under Article 216(1) TFEU in 
order to conclude international agreements in the field of criminal law. This provision 
provides that:  
<quotation>[t]he Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries 
or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion 
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of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s 
policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a 
legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their 
scope.</quotation> 
Article 216(1) therefore establishes that EU competence may emerge not only from an 
express conferment by the Treaties but may equally flow implicitly from other 
provisions of the Treaties and from measures adopted within the framework of those 
provisions by EU institutions.8 What is more, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) has accepted that whenever EU law creates, for EU institutions, powers 
within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the EU has 
authority to undertake international commitments necessary for the attainment of that 
objective even in the absence of an express provision to that effect.9 Hence, post-
Lisbon, international agreements within the AFSJ are based either on the objectives or 
on a Decision adopted within the area of the AFSJ provisions of the Treaty. This is 
because, as explained, despite the external character of AFSJ policies (e.g., 
immigration, asylum, transnational crime), there is no express external competence for 
the EU to act in the field other than on common asylum and immigration policy. 
Implied powers under Article 216(1) TFEU may therefore come in handy for the 
Council in this ‘Area’, which is very much in the making and has only recently ‘lifted 
off’. 
 
<a>3 INSTRUMENTS OF EU INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL 
MATTERS 
Despite the above competence hurdles, international cooperation in criminal matters is 
manifested rather indirectly, with criminal law appearing as a side issue in international 
agreements signed between the EU and third countries. Such cooperation has occurred 
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in four distinct ways:  
<nl> 
(i) through the EU classic range of instruments, i.e., bilateral agreements with third 
countries such as those concluded in the past on the basis of ex Articles 24 and Article 
38 TEU.10 Such agreements are now concluded under the implied power vested in 
Article 216(1) TFEU; 
(ii) through priorities set in the context of EU enlargement, including Association 
Agreements which provide reciprocal rights and obligations as well as a prospect of full 
EU membership. These Agreements are based on Article 217 TFEU which provides that 
‘the Union may conclude with one or more third countries or international organisations 
agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, 
common action and special procedure’;11 
(iii) through individual international cooperation mechanisms such as the so-called 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) predominantly occupied with 
establishing a free trade area. These were originally concluded as mixed (cross-pillar) 
agreements between the EU, the Member States and the newly independent states that 
emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union.12 They are now concluded on the basis of 
Article 212 TFEU which provides that ‘the Union shall carry out economic, financial 
and technical cooperation measures, including assistance, in particular financial 
assistance, with third countries other than developing countries’;13  
(iv) through Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) between the EU and 
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Western Balkan countries which emerged from Yugoslavia’s ruins. These are 
instruments granting these countries tariff-free access to EU markets and technical and 
financial assistance in exchange for commitment to political, economic, trade or 
administrative reforms. As with Association Agreements, Article 217 TFEU serves as 
the legal basis for SAAs.</list> 
These ‘Agreements’ can be considered as international treaties for the purpose 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.14 Their legal effect is immensely 
significant not least because, inter alia, they intensify the EU’s external profile on 
cooperation in criminal matters. What is important, however, is whether the 
commitments that the partner states have voluntarily undertaken under the above 
agreements are respected domestically and whether the EU has the competence and the 
means to enforce them against them. This is all the more important in the field of 
criminal law where, apart from the classic bilateral or Association Agreements, specific 
cooperation on freedom, security and justice is also based on a non-legally binding 
setting through, inter alia, the establishment of the so-called Common Spaces on 
Freedom Security and Justice (FSJ) in the context of EU strategic partnerships. The aim 
is to create a replica of the AFSJ between the EU and third countries based on loose 
obligations. We will focus below on the criminal law aspects of the EU strategic 
partnership with Russia, EU’s biggest neighbour,15 and regional cooperation with the 
Western Balkans, known as the least integrated and the most unstable region in Europe. 
We will identify the challenges underlying the current institutional setting in those 
relations which, although fundamentally different, are directed to similar goals. 
 
<b>3.1 EU-Russia Strategic Partnership  
Political and operational cooperation between the EU and Russia takes place outside the 
European Neighbourhood Policy in a number of areas such as drug and human 
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trafficking, organized crime, cybercrime and counter-terrorism. These are duly 
recognized by the EU in Article 83 TFEU to constitute serious crimes with a cross-
border dimension. In the context of the EU internal policy-making, these are crimes in 
respect of which the EU is competent to establish minimum rules for its Member States 
concerning the definition of criminal offences and appropriate sanctions. In the external 
context, however, there is no such power of approximation. EU-Russia relationships are 
based on mutual cooperation manifested in instruments such as the Cooperation 
Agreement between Europol and Russia on data exchange launched in 2010. The key 
instrument fostering EU-Russia relationships is the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement in Justice Liberty and Security (1997). While this is the main legally binding 
framework for cooperation, the main instrument to set out the EU-Russia justice, liberty 
and security agenda is the non-legally binding Roadmap for the Common Space on FSJ 
(2005), although there is certain political momentum to turn this into a legally binding 
bilateral framework agreement.16 This is because PCAs are generally vehicles of 
political and economic transition (including visas and mobility) and, therefore, lack 
justiciable provisions concerning police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.17 
Notwithstanding the PCA asymmetry, EU-Russia cooperation has overall been 
adequate in the field of organized crime. Apart from the Europol-Russia relationship 
transition from strategic cooperation into a fully-fledged operational cooperation, there 
are new incentives to enhance training of law enforcement agencies in Russia as well as 
establishing memoranda of understanding to facilitate information exchange and drug-
related crime prevention. To this end, the two sides have signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and the Russian 
Federal Drug Control Service18 and, more recently, they decided on a bilateral 
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agreement on Drug Precursors (2013).19 Significant effort has also been made in the 
area of counter-terrorism, where both the EU and Russia appear willing to produce a 
future memorandum of understanding on the fight against terrorism and drugs 
cooperation.20 The strategy focuses predominantly on combating terrorist financing by 
both reducing the availability of funds and providing for the freezing of terrorist assets. 
These developments have been embraced by the Russian Ministry of Justice which has 
hosted periodic meetings on FSJ (17 so far) with EU representatives and EU-Russia 
Summits (31 so far). The purpose of those is to encourage further cooperation and 
exchange of experience on the fight against drug trafficking, corruption and terrorism, 
as well as consolidating mutual legal assistance on criminal cases.21  
The above progress aside, the EU-Russia partnership is based on somewhat 
loose obligations. For instance, judicial cooperation in criminal matters takes place 
through one-off bilateral contacts between Russia’s General Prosecutor’s Office and the 
competent authorities of EU Member States or Eurojust. There are no common 
minimum standards for safeguards in criminal procedure. In this regard, the external 
dimension of the EU’s AFSJ has been supplemented by the relationship that Russia has 
developed with the Council of Europe. For instance, since Russia ratified the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1998, not only is the ECHR firmly a part of 
Russia’s legal system but also the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) are treated as binding precedents by domestic courts. This is important in 
transplanting European standards of procedural rights to Russia which are equivalent to 
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those protected by the EU.22 We must recall here that Article 6(3) TEU refers to the 
ECHR as part of the general principles of EU law which also have external application.  
With reference to substantive criminal law, Russia has ratified the Council of 
Europe Convention on Corruption (2007), the Additional Protocol to the European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2000), the European Convention 
on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters (2008) and the Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime and on the 
Financing of Terrorism (2009).23 The objectives behind these Conventions to some 
extent reflect the intentions found in ‘internal EU secondary legislation on EU mutual 
assistance in criminal matters between the EU and its Member States. The Council of 
Europe Conventions, however, do not impose similar obligations or liability in case of 
faulty implementation or breach. As such, their non-binding targets cannot compensate 
for the lack of legally binding regulations between the EU and Russia. What is more, 
Russia’s adherence to the Council of Europe’s Conventions is not always matched with 
a comparable human rights threshold to the ECHR standards of protection. Areas of 
incompatibility vary from substandard protection of privacy and control over the 
protection of personal information, to distrust in the functioning of the judicial system 
vis-à-vis the right to a fair trial protected under Article 6 ECHR.24  
Notwithstanding the EU Neighbourhood Barometer’s results which shows that 
57 per cent of Russians believe that the EU and Russia share sufficient common values 
to be able to cooperate,25 severe ECHR breaches by Russian law enforcement 
authorities are likely to cause turbulence in EU-Russia relations. Such breaches are 
detrimental to democracy and the rule of law (enshrined in EU law in Article 2 TEU) 
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and provoke reactions and criminal behaviour (such as the 2013 Volgograd twin 
terrorist attacks) which threaten the protection of critical infrastructure in Russia, a 
major EU priority area. The purpose of the Strategic Partnership with the EU is, 
therefore, undermined for as long as Russia’s systemic human rights violations are still 
at issue. Since it does not seem politically expedient for the EU to suspend or freeze its 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia until the above breaches are 
remedied,26 the ECtHR appears to be the only ‘European’ Court that could enforce a 
culture of compliance in Russia vis-à-vis the protection of the rights of suspected or 
accused persons, criminal defendants and convicted criminals.  
In the past five years only, the ECtHR has ruled against Russia on numerous 
occasions concerning the rights of the defence in criminal proceedings in relation to 
ineffective legal assistance during appeal proceedings,27 violation of the ne bis in idem 
principle,28 and excessive use and duration of pre-trial detention and custody,29 to name 
but a few ECHR breaches.30 For some of these cases, the Strasbourg Court has utilized 
the pilot judgment procedure to deal with repetitive applications arising from the same 
recurrent issue at the domestic level.31 The role of the ECtHR is, therefore, significant in 
compelling the Russian authorities to address human rights breaches also condemned by 
the EU and to help enhance the EU-Russia partnership through the penetration of a 
European dimension into Russia’s domestic discourse.32 
 
<b>3.2 Regional Cooperation with Western Balkan States 
The EU-Western Balkans relationship has been developed in the framework of the EU 
enlargement policy. If there was a motto to describe the European integration of 
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Western Balkan states post-2003, it would be ‘stabilization with a view to accession 
negotiations’.33 Apart from visa facilitation and readmission initiatives, the EU’s 
approach to the region includes tackling corruption and intertwined sectors of organized 
crime activities, namely, trafficking in drugs, human beings and weapons. This is 
endemic in light of the region’s non-retentive borders, poor regional cooperation and ill-
functioning institutions. The chosen EU method of addressing these problems is, first, 
through the rebuilding and transformation of law enforcement institutions and court 
systems; and secondly, through capabilities enhancement. To this end, the EU has 
established since 2001 individual Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) 
with Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (2001); 
Albania (2006); Montenegro (2007); Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia (2008). SAAs 
share a similar model of external leverage with the EU-Russia PCA, discussed above, 
i.e., offering, inter alia, a relaxed visa regime through facilitation and readmission 
schemes.  
As bilateral agreements, SAAs are different to PCAs, discussed in the context of 
the EU-Russia relationship. Not only are they legally binding but they are also based 
upon a strong conditionality approach which suggests approximation to EU rules. They 
also promote strong neighbourly relations and regional cooperation (for example, 
through addressing common threats in connection with organized crime activities and 
integrated border management). Furthermore, the EU has established Roadmaps on 
corruption and cross-border police cooperation, as well as financial and human 
resources support for institutional and capacity building (e.g., through creating 
appropriate units in ministries or the police and setting up counter-money laundering 
offices). Notwithstanding these rule of law sector-strengthening efforts, crime and 
corruption is seen as deeply entrenched in the politics of Western Balkan states, 
sometimes with strong links to organized crime groups. This means that although police 
authorities are able to arrest suspects based on evidence, the judicial system has, more 
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 See EU-Western Balkans Summit, Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003. Press Release available at 
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often than not, abstained from prosecuting.34 Even when prosecution takes place, the 
level of sentencing in organized crime cases remains relatively low.35 Hence, public 
order and judicial reform as well as improving the reliability of statistics on the fight 
against crime are key to the EU’s benchmarking efforts to exert external influence in 
FSJ.  
But can the swift transition of potential EU candidates to a free market 
economy, which is paramount to the progressive EU-Western Balkans partnership, 
occur without fulfilment of the states’ criminal justice commitments in the framework 
of the SAAs? Obviously, fulfilment of the set criteria depends on the specific features of 
each state. However, experience from recent EU enlargements demonstrates that the 
high threshold of conditionality does not imply a high level of integration with reference 
to adjustments in criminal law. This is especially the case with Croatia where, at the 
time of its accession to the EU, not only corruption and hate crime remained prevalent 
but the country did not have the administrative capacity in place necessary for the 
proper implementation of the EU criminal acquis. In particular, the application of 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) has met 
with certain difficulties in Croatia in relation to officials who participated in the 
Yugoslav wars.36 Although we will avoid making generalizations, especially due to the 
somewhat patchy implementation of the EAW in the existing Member States, there is 
evidence that crime, corruption and tax evasion cost Croatia billions of Euros.37  
The story of Croatia, which was considered advanced enough to undergo a 
process of Stabilisation and Association, shows that EU enlargement conditionality has 
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 European Union’s IPA Programme for Western Balkans, Main Report (February 2012), pp. 26–35, 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/phare/evaluation/2013_final_main_report_lot_3.
pdf; see also H. Gramckow ‘The Challenge of Making Courts More Efficient: Recent Experiences of the 
Western Balkans States’ in Law in Transition (2011), pp. 61–3, available at 
www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/law/lit11ei.pdf. 
35
 The Commission’s monitoring report on Croatia’s accession preparations mentions that overall the 
level of sentencing for organized crime is low. Commission Communication, Monitoring Report on 
Croatia’s Accessions Preparations, COM(2013)171 final (Brussels, 26 March 2013), p. 7. 
36
 ‘Croatia defies EU on arrest warrant’, EurActiv, 26 August 2013, available at 
www.euractiv.com/justice/croatia-defies-eu-arrest-warrant-news-529939. 
37
 ‘EU should stop funding Croatia’s corrupt networks’, EU Observer, 17 January 2013, available at 
http://euobserver.com/opinion/118760. 
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not succeeded in raising criminal law standards in the country. The recurrent issue, 
also prominent in the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, which are facing similar 
problems of unruliness, is that EU enlargement places more emphasis on transplanting 
the EU’s concrete model of market economy than its abstract commitment to the rule of 
law. As such, addressing short-term security and justice priorities appears to constitute 
enough evidence for the EU to give a candidate state the green light vis-à-vis the 
fulfilment of its European perspective. Of course, this approach is not sustainable in the 
medium-to-long term and has negative repercussions in achieving the external criminal 
objectives of the AFSJ.  
 
<a>4 CONCLUSION: COMPETENCE OR COMPETENCY? 
The aim of the EU to keep Russia close and integrate the Western Balkans region, and 
to make this a priority, is an ambitious project in EU external relations. As far as 
international cooperation in criminal matters is concerned, the level of partnership or 
integration that can be achieved between the parties is conditional upon EU competence 
to conclude agreements with third parties that create binding legal obligations and EU 
pre-accession strategy. Indeed, some progress has been made in EU bilateral relations 
and both the EU and its partner states seem to have embraced a European perspective in 
dealing with transnational crime. However, any future plans to provide a solid legal 
basis for EU AFSJ partnerships seems to be constrained by the Treaty’s lack of express 
external competence in criminal law and the somewhat loose commitments generated 
by the EU’s pre-accession strategy. The sometimes equivocal EU-Russia relations and 
the lack of credibility of EU conditionality manifested in the EU-Western Balkans 
SAAs provides a good testing ground for the future of EU international cooperation in 
criminal law.  
With reference to Russia, although negotiations on a new agreement to replace 
the current PCA started in 2008, the establishment of a sound and legally binding 
bilateral framework between the EU and Russia to cover criminal aspects raises 
questions vis-à-vis the principle of conferral of powers. In particular, the ambition to 
deepen EU-Russia relations on criminal law has exposed a legal competence gap that 
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cannot be filled unless the current Treaties are revised or Russia is willing to tighten 
up its ties to the EU by entering into a SAA. However, as seen in the context of the 
Western Balkan states, SAAs are ‘pre-association’ agreements subjecting states to 
policy-related conditionality in return for a remote accession possibility. The recent EU-
Russia tensions over Ukraine demonstrate that the SAA model is unappealing to Russia, 
which appears to be a rival suitor to the EU. Current evidence demonstrates that not 
only does Russia wish to maintain its sphere of influence but it also aspires to retain its 
customs union (the Eurasian Economic Community) by steering neighbouring states 
away from the EU.38 As such, it is more likely that any new EU-Russia Agreement 
would be in line with the parties’ geostrategic interests and only go as far as to cover 
trade, investment and energy.39  
On the other side of the spectrum, modernization and adjustment to the 
advanced European models is highly challenging for the Western Balkan states. 
Although the EU is competent through SAAs to enter into legally binding obligations 
that in theory provide for adjustments in criminal law, in practice, it seems somewhat 
cumbersome for the EU to force progress and secure harmonized standards in the 
region. This is even more so given the EU’s ill-designed approach to Western Balkan 
states’ accession negotiations characterized by a lack of concrete benchmarks and a far-
off accession perspective. The latter has added to the transition economies’ lethargic 
approach and to an overall ‘enlargement fatigue’.40 As it is expected, doubts over the 
prospects of EU membership have generated little political motivation in the associated 
states to move quickly and invest money and effort to build functional and sustainable 
constitutional and institutional reforms.  
What is more, EU international cooperation in criminal matters is hindered by 
                                                 
38
 J. Forbrig, ‘Why Ukraine’s future lies with the EU, not Russia’, Opinion on CNN, 4 December 2013, 
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/03/opinion/ukraine-protests-russia-forbrig/. 
39
 Such a new agreement could still be concluded, like the PCAs, under Art. 212 TFEU but could be 
extended in other fields by bringing in another more specific legal basis (e.g., environment, energy). In 
this case the EU would have to explore the possibility of including its Member States by signing a mixed 
agreement with Russia. Alternatively, a new agreement on trade and investment could be concluded 
under Art. 207 TFEU. See Van Elsuwege, Towards a Modernisation of EU-Russia Legal Relations?, 
above n. 16, at 12. 
40
 See M. Braniff, Integrating the Balkans: Conflict Resolution and the Impact of EU Expansion 
(London/New York, IB Tauris, 2011), p. 94. 
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the fact that the AFSJ is an area of shared competence. This means that unless totally 
pre-empted, Member States can still act unilaterally in the AFSJ and therefore conclude 
agreements on their own with third states. For instance, after its EU accession, Poland 
signed a local border traffic agreement with Russia in 2012. Estonia also signed a 
bilateral agreement with Russia for cooperation against the illicit traffic and use of 
narcotic drugs in 2009. Given the lack of external criminal competence, such 
bilateralism compensates for the lack of EU unified external action in criminal matters. 
At the same time, bilateralism discourages any uniform response from the EU. The 
proliferation of bilateral relationships between EU Member States and EU partner states 
implies that the conclusion and ratification of new agreements on behalf of the EU has 
become a secondary priority.  
Last but not least, there are fundamental constitutional impediments to 
deepening the relations between the EU and its partners. Under Article 218 TFEU, the 
conclusion of an international agreement with Russia requires unanimity in the Council 
and the consent of the European Parliament. Such consensus would be difficult to 
secure in view of the fact that Russia is not fully compliant with the EU values listed in 
Article 2 TEU. This provision states that the rule of law constitutes a ‘value’ and adds 
that it is ‘common’ to Member States. What is more, Article 21(1) TEU places the rule 
of law in the context of EU foreign policy and attributes to it an exportable quality. The 
logic behind this provision is that since the rule of law has inspired the creation of the 
EU as a democratic system of governance, then it can be legitimately exported to third 
parties, such as the Western Balkan states. This is a unique function of the rule of law 
which distinguishes it from the intrinsic notion operating within the bounds of the 
Member States constitutional orders. In this respect, not only does Article 21(1) TEU 
boost the extra-territorial claim of the EU as a value promoter alongside the Council of 
Europe, but it also makes adherence to the EU rule of law a necessity in the conduct of 
EU international cooperation with third countries.  
For as long as the above legal and political frictions stand between the EU and 
its partners, the EU may have or acquire the legal competence, but would still be 
lacking the political competency, to consistently achieve or exceed its external goals. 
